Your agent says it refunded $42.50.Prove it.
Provenant writes signed, hash-chained receipts of what your agents actually did. Anyone can verify them offline — with no access to your systems and no reason to trust you.
Exhibit A — live chain
SHA-256 computed in your browserThese are three real receipts, with the hashes recomputed from their bytes as you change them. The last one was timestamped by DigiCert on 3 September 2026.
The operator holds the keys
An agent's log is only as honest as whoever holds the disk. Someone with database access and the agent's signing key can rewrite a receipt, relink every hash after it, and re-sign the lot. The result is a chain that is internally flawless.
Below is that exact attack, run against a real store. On the left, Provenant's own local verification. On the right, the same forged chain checked against its external timestamp. Both outputs are copied verbatim from the tool.
$ provenant chain verify ok: true failures: 0 receipts_checked: 3 # the forged chain passes, # completely.
$ provenant-verify evidence.json FORGERY DETECTED. The receipts in this bundle do not produce the head that was externally timestamped at seq 2. Someone altered the history after it was anchored, and could not forge a replacement timestamp. exit 1
Recording is free. Proving it to a stranger is the paid part.
That split is technical, not artificial. A chain kept on your own disk attests to itself — it cannot rule out that you rewrote it. An external timestamp from an authority you don't control can. That is the only thing we charge for.
Provenant Core
- Unlimited receipts and agents, self-hosted
- Hash chain, Ed25519 signatures, local verification
provenant-verify— offline bundle verification, never paywalled- CLI with
--jsonon every command - No time limit, no agent cap
Evidence bundle
- Pay as you go, no subscription
- Your chain head timestamped by a public RFC 3161 authority
- A self-contained archive an auditor verifies offline
- Human-readable report for the people who won't read JSON
- We hold a copy, so the evidence exists when you need it
- You cannot anchor retroactively — that's the whole point
Cloud
- Continuous anchoring, batched, at most 15 minutes apart
- 5 bundles/month, no rollover
- $10 per extra bundle
- 10 agent identities included
- $4/mo per extra identity
- 90-day retention
- 1M receipts/month fair-use cap (not billed)
Enterprise
- Retention and anchoring cadence set by contract
- Volume beyond the Cloud fair-use cap
- Terms agreed with you, not listed here
Sixty seconds to a verified receipt
# from source — these packages are not on npm yet git clone https://github.com/JaredKlopstein/provenant.git cd provenant pnpm install pnpm run build # record what your agent just did node packages/core/bin/lacre.mjs init node packages/core/bin/lacre.mjs record --action refund.issue \ --action-detail '{"customer_id":"c_8812","amount_usd":42.50}' \ --side-effect-class irreversible # prove the local chain is intact node packages/core/bin/lacre.mjs chain verify # check a bundle someone hands you — offline, no account node packages/verifier/bin/lacre-verify.mjs examples/sample-evidence/evidence.json
There is a real DigiCert-anchored sample bundle in the repository. Verify it before you trust anything on this page.
What Provenant does not do
- It does not make you compliant with anything. It produces tamper-evident records that support logging obligations. We are not lawyers and this is not legal advice.
- An anchor does not prove completeness. Receipts written since the last anchor can still be dropped. Anchoring often narrows that window; it never closes it, and the verifier tells you exactly how far the proof reaches.
- It cannot see what an agent declines to record. Receipts make recorded behaviour tamper-evident. They cannot make unrecorded behaviour appear.
- A timestamp inside a bundle is not a vote of confidence. Anyone can mint a certificate. Trust comes from a fingerprint you pin yourself, and the verifier reports soundness and trust as two separate answers.